



In recent years, scholars have devoted increasing attention to the prospect of
personalized law. The bulk of the literature has so far concerned whether to
personalize any law and, if so, what substantive changes should be instantiated
through personalization. Comparatively little discussion has gone to the authorship
of personalized laws. Who will make personalized laws? Who will enforce them? In
this Essay, I propose we consider the who in the personalization debate. Specifically,
I identify the policy considerations that bear on the optimal maker or enforcer of
personalized law. To put it another way, my Essay begins where most of the prior
literature leaves off: having concluded that personalized law has some merit in a
given area, I ask when the state should facilitate personalized lawmaking by
nonstate actors.
While there are many threads in the discussion, one theme emerges: the move
to personalized law is often best taken by private lawmakers. Thus, as both a de-
scriptive and normative matter, a future that makes the best use of personalized law
should involve a diminished role for state directives.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars have devoted increasing attention
to the prospect of personalized law. The bulk of the literature
has so far concerned whether to personalize any law1 and, if so,
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1 See generally, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Man-
datory Rules in Contract Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 255 (2019) (arguing that personalized con-
sumer contracts produce more efficient outcomes); Gerhard Wagner and Horst
Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Pref-
erences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U Chi L Rev 581 (2019)
(examining possible negative effects of personalization on business-to-consumer transac-
tions); Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is a Function of
Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U Chi L Rev 217 (2019) (examining the costs,
benefits, and possible responses to data-driven price discrimination);
Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Assessing the Empirical Upside of Person-
alized Criminal Procedure, 86 U Chi L Rev 489 (2019) (examining the potential benefits
of personalizing criminal procedure); Deborah W. Denno, Neuroscience and the Personali-
zation of Criminal Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 359 (2019) (arguing that using neuroscientific evi-
dence to evaluate defendants’ mental culpability can personalize criminal law).
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what substantive changes should be instantiated through
personalization.2
Comparatively little discussion has gone to the authorship of
personalized laws. Who will make personalized laws?3 Who will
enforce them?4 The little attention directed to this question has
assumed a somewhat conventional public/private dichotomy.
Some papers have focused on ways in which the state could per-
sonalize its directives to citizens.5 Other work has focused on how
personalization might help contracting parties better vindicate
their objectives.6 In these latter papers, the only question for the
2 See, for example, Adi Libson and Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personaliza-
tion of Copyright Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 527, 542–46 (2019) (suggesting ways to personalize
copyright law based on personalized consumption data); Christoph Busch, Implementing
Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86
U Chi L Rev 309, 324–30 (2019) (suggesting potential elements for a personalized regula-
tory design for consumer law and data privacy law).
3 Within this Symposium, an exception is Professor Lee Fennell’s contribution,
which considers the possibility of self-authored law. See Lee Anne Fennell, Personalizing
Precommitment, 86 U Chi L Rev 433, 447–56 (2019).
4 Within this Symposium, one exception may be Professor Dan L. Burk’s contribu-
tion, focusing on how content owners will monitor and challenge arguable infringement in
ways that erode fair use exceptions. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U Chi L
Rev 283, 290–94 (2019). Although the tasks of enforcement and lawmaking can be com-
bined in the same body, they are distinct tasks. Compare A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Mon-
itors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers,
85 Va L Rev 925, 965–66 (1999) (emphasizing the enforcement function of trading mar-
kets), with Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va L Rev 1453, 1457–62
(1997) (emphasizing trading markets’ rulemaking function). See also Stavros Gadinis and
Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S Cal L Rev 1239, 1246–48 (2007)
(distinguishing among rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement). I do not emphasize the
monitoring function here because that function is not obviously amenable to personaliza-
tion, at least not apart from the enforcement function.
5 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U Pa L Rev 1, 30–36
(2013) (focusing discussion on possible default rules public sector regulators and judges
could adopt); Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417, 1441–50 (2014) (suggesting applications
of personalization to various areas of law); Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, The
Death of Rules and Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401, 1410–11 (2017) (discussing how techno-
logical developments could facilitate personalized microdirectives); Omri Ben-Shahar and
Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L Rev 627, 676–79 (2016) (proposing
procedures by which courts could implement personalization, including gradually person-
alizing the law and making presumptions to fill gaps in data).
6 See, for example, Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 Wm & Mary L Rev
1869, 1896–1915 (2014) (describing institutions that provide personalized, transaction-
specific guidance on legal obligations in construction contracts and financial derivatives);
Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1441–42 (cited in note 5) (describing how per-
sonalized default rules might affect consumer contracts); Anthony J. Casey and
Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J Corp L 1, 9 (2017) (explaining how micro-
directives provide parties with greater certainty about their contractual obligations). But
see George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80
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state is whether to tolerate these arrangements as ordinary con-
tractual provisions.
Yet law arises in settings other than state-centered public
law and atomistic bilateral contracts. Private industry associa-
tions, such as diamond dealers, draft their own rules, adjudicate
them in their own tribunals, and enforce them through nonlegal
sanctions.7 Sports leagues do the same thing.8 Self-regulating
organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, regulate market professionals. So do stock exchanges,
which also impose rules on corporate issuers. One of the great ad-
vances in legal scholarship in the last thirty years has been re-
newed focus on private ordering and lawmaking institutions, yet
personalized law has yet to make this turn.
In this Essay, I propose we consider the who in the personal-
ization debate. Specifically, I identify the policy considerations
that bear on the optimal maker or enforcer of personalized law.
To put it another way, my Essay begins where most of the prior
literature leaves off: having concluded that personalized law has
some merit in a given area, I ask when the state should facilitate
personalized lawmaking by nonstate actors.
The Essay proceeds as follows: Part I briefly summarizes
many of the lessons from the law personalization literature. I
identify the factors that militate in favor of or against personali-
zation of a given directive. In Part II, I turn to the question of
private law generally. Quite apart from personalization, a vast
literature analyzes the question of the optimal lawmaker. In
Part III, I analyze these two literatures—personalization and
privatization—in tandem to explore whether there are any les-
sons that arise from the interaction of these two agendas. In the
Conclusion, I briefly consider the menu of options for state actors
to effectuate private regulation when it is appropriate.
One word of clarification is that I use the words “law” and
“lawmaker” quite generally here. The drafter of a contract is a
Tulane L Rev 1109, 1129–59 (2006) (arguing that simpler, generalized default rules are
less costly and therefore preferable in contract law); Ian Ayers and Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87,
91–93, 117–18 (1989) (providing “a general theory of . . . how [to] choose between tailored
and untailored default rules”).
7 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115, 132–35 (1992).
8 See Robert C. Ellickson, When Civil Society Uses an Iron Fist: The Roles of Private
Associations in Rulemaking and Adjudication, 18 Am L & Econ Rev 235, 248–49,
257–61 (2016).
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lawmaker for my purposes because she creates directives for her
counterparty. A boss directing an employee is also a lawmaker
even though an insubordinate employee could ignore the order.
I. WHEN SHOULD THE LAW PERSONALIZE?
Speed limits constrain the lawful driving speed for a given
stretch of road. They are impersonal directives in that they apply
to every driver equally. There is no exemption that permits highly
competent drivers, or those with very important meetings, to
exceed the posted speed limit.
Other constraints involve a measure of personalization. Posi-
tion limits in commodities markets can provide such an example.
Position limits constrain the amount of commodities futures that
a single trader can own at a given time. Position limits are prophy-
lactics against market abuse: if no one can own very much of any
one asset, no one will have much power to disrupt the market.9
At their furthest points, position limits are impersonal, just
like speed limits: exchange rules limit a trader of live cattle fu-
tures to something like 450 contracts of 40,000 pounds each, or
18,000,000 pounds.10 For futures on the Russel 2000 Stock Index,
the current limit is around 100,000 units.11
Yet position limits are personalized over much of their range.
The right to even approach the hard ceiling of the position limit
is constrained by a trader’s identity and agenda, as well as
market conditions. Below the hard ceiling of the position limit,
exchanges create “position accountability levels” as presumptive
ceilings.12 Anyone who reaches these levels must stop increasing
their position until the exchange can solicit more information
about “the nature and size of the position, the trading strategy
9 In the Matter of McVean Trading & Investments, LLC, CFTC No 17-15, Comm
Fut L Rptr (CCH) ¶ 34,057 (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 2929416) (using a position-
limits violation as the linchpin of a manipulation case).
10 Several factors impact the position limit. For example, as the contract approaches
delivery date, the limit lowers. For live cattle, it drops to three hundred contracts. Like-
wise, some contract levels vary according to market conditions, rising or lowering as a
function of deliverable supply. See, for example, Saberi v Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 488 F3d 1207, 1210–13 (9th Cir 2007) (describing the CME’s position limit
for pork belly futures contracts as “a function of both the total deliverable supply of frozen
pork bellies and the time left until the expiration of the futures contracts,” and citing CME
Rule 8302.E(4), which defined deliverable supply as “the number of registered deliverable
pork bellies reported in the CME Clearing House Department’s weekly report immediately
preceding the first Friday of each expiring contract month”).
11 CME Position Limits (CME Group), archived at http://perma.cc/L57L-KDH5.
12 The accountability and position levels vary by commodity contract.
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employed with respect to the position, and hedging information,
if applicable.”13 After this, the trader may be permitted to
continue to grow her position, or the trader may be instructed to
reduce it. For example, Chicago Board of Trade treasury bond
futures have an accountability level of $1 billion.14 Thus, a trader
who acquires a $1 billion notional position must stop buying
futures until she receives a personalized instruction from the
exchange. Only at much higher levels, thirty thousand contracts
or $3 billion, do uniform limits on ownership arrive to constrain
all traders equally.15 Implicit in this stepping up is that certain
traders have legitimate rights to trade at higher limits than
others—a personalized law.
In addition to exchange-made limits, Congress has instructed
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to craft its
own position limits so as to “permit producers, purchasers,
sellers, middlemen, and users of a commodity or a product derived
therefrom to hedge their legitimate anticipated business needs
for that period of time into the future for which an appropriate
futures contract is open and available on an exchange.”16 The
Commission is supposed to pay special attention to the largest
hedgers in order “to prevent unwarranted price pressures by
large hedgers.”17 The bona fide hedging exemption is supposed to
cover hedging that “is economically appropriate to the reduction
of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enter-
prise”18 or arises from potential changes in value in commodities
or services one owns, owes, or will soon own or owe.19 Also, one
may hedge the risk of being counterparty to a bona fide hedger.20
Speed limits are impersonal. Position limits admit of person-
alization. What factors should inform the optimal degree of per-
sonalization of a given area of law? Summarizing the literature, I
13 Market Regulation Advisory Notice RA1711-5 *2 (CME Group, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/96X4-LZ82.
14 Or ten thousand contracts. CBOT Position Limits (CME Group), archived at
http://perma.cc/PZL6-LTXD. The contract size for one US Treasury bond future is
$100,000. U.S. Treasury Bond Futures Contract Specs (CME Group, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/WK4M-FEQY.
15 On the distinction between position limits, position accountability levels, and ex-
emptions, see Market Regulation Advisory Notice RA1518-5R *1–2 (CME Group, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/CV5Y-JRER.
16 7 USC § 6a(c)(1).
17 7 USC § 6a(c)(1).
18 7 USC § 6a(c)(2)(A)(ii).
19 See 7 USC § 6a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(III).
20 See 7 USC § 6a(c)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
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suggest that there are three broad considerations relevant to the
personalization question, each of which is decided by several fac-
tual and normative considerations. I briefly summarize these
claims below.
A. Formal Equality
Impersonal law treats all subjects formally alike. By address-
ing all subjects equally, an impersonal law may affirm common
membership in a community. Addressing some individuals differ-
ently may emphasize or reify their differences. For example, a law
that changes women’s names by default upon marriage may sub-
ordinate women as a group, encourage stereotypes about what
women want, or penalize women who differ from the norm. Im-
personal law—a law that switches names for everyone or no one—
avoids this problem.21
Yet formal equality can result in substantive inequality if in-
dividuals have different needs and capacities. A tort law requir-
ing the same actions of everyone could treat blind people too
roughly, because they may be unable to comply with some direc-
tives, and skilled people too gently, because they could easily im-
prove their compliance above the typical level.22
A closely related observation is that formal equality often en-
tails cross-subsidies. These cross-subsidies can help the least
powerful or sophisticated subjects. If a single law must accommo-
date all subjects, then the lawmaker must make a law that is ac-
ceptable to powerful members of the subject group. Vulnerable
individuals may be able to free ride off of those rules;23 left on their
own to bargain in contract or lobby for good treatment, it is pos-
sible that vulnerable subjects might make mistakes or lack the
power to obtain good terms. For example, it is now easy and cheap
21 See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121
Yale L J 2032, 2111–13 (2012) (describing how tailoring default rules for different types
of parties can be discriminatory); Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Fram-
ing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U Chi L Rev 761, 827–39 (2007) (discussing
different possible marital name defaults).
22 See Ben-Shahar and Porat, 91 NYU L Rev at 637–42 (cited in note 5) (describing
how tort law treats both those with diminished and elevated capacities).
23 Vulnerability is used here as a relative rather than absolute concept. For example,
the absence of retroactive taxes is supported by a coalition of property owners. Saul
Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J Legal Stud 265, 280, 296–301 (1993).
Members of the coalition may not be especially vulnerable, but some members of the group
would be more vulnerable to retroactive taxation than others. For example, those with
very little property may not find it rational to organize resistance, but they can free ride
on the rational resistance efforts of those with more to lose. Id.
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to form a corporation or LLC, but it was once costly. Corporation
promoters needed to obtain a charter by act of legislature.24 Ob-
taining such an act often involved costly bribes.25 The effort to lib-
eralize chartering may well have been led by wealthy individu-
als—they were the ones paying bribes after all—but their efforts
led to widespread availability of legal entities to promoters of
modest means. Uniform access means greater access for those
who previously had access but much greater access for those who
previously had no access at all.
The same dynamic operates in the construction of private le-
gal schemes. For example, when firms engage in mass contract-
ing, their tendency to use similar contracts across many custom-
ers forces them to treat customers equally. Firms often write
terms in a way that attracts the informed customers. This bene-
fits the most ignorant customers, who cannot or will not negotiate
for better terms or comparison shop.26 Ignorant or constrained
customers may get a worse deal if the firms can offer different
terms or price discriminate.
Yet vulnerable subjects can also subsidize strong ones.27 As
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat write for this
Symposium:
If weak consumers are the recipients of a cross-subsidy under
a uniform price regime, they could lose it if prices are person-
alized and might even be priced out. The culprit for this prob-
lem is the personalization of prices. As long as prices are uni-
form, the personalization of the protection itself does not
necessarily hurt the weakest consumers. On the contrary, if
weak consumers are the recipients of higher than average
personalized protection, the cross-subsidy embodied in a uni-
form price would be bolstered.28
24 See Howard Bodenhorn, Bank Chartering and Political Corruption in Antebellum
New York: Free Banking as Reform, in Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, eds, Cor-
ruption and Reform: Lessons from America’s Economic History 231, 233 (Chicago 2006).
25 See id at 235.
26 See Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 630, 638–39 (1979).
27 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Man-
datory Arbitration, 83 U Chi L Rev 1755, 1804–05 (2016) (discussing how lower-income
consumers bear costs of access to the courts); Omri Ben-Shahar and Eric A. Posner, The
Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 J Legal Stud 115, 128, 144–45 (2011) (arguing that
a mandatory right to return a purchase requires those who would prefer to forgo that right
in exchange for a discounted price to “cross-subsidize other buyers”).
28 Ben-Shahar and Porat, 86 U Chi L Rev at 273 (cited in note 1).
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Evaluating this cross-subsidy in light of public policy goals re-
quires some knowledge of who is subsidizing whom.
Nor does formal equality optimize incentives. A tort law that
holds talented individuals to a higher standard of conduct may
encourage them to use their talents to a greater degree in order
to avoid liability, just as a tort law that imposes higher penalties
on individuals less able to take appropriate care in a risky activity
discourages them from participating in that activity. Just as in-
surance can encourage better behavior by tailoring premiums to
risk, law can improve incentives when tailored to individuals.
B. Knowledge of Subjects
In order to personalize law, lawmakers must be able to ac-
quire and process granular information about individuals and
groups. Until recently, wide-scale surveillance and data pro-
cessing seemed technologically unfeasible. However, trends in
data gathering and analysis suggest that well-resourced lawmak-
ers may soon have the technical ability to link directives to highly
particular individual traits. Increasingly, the most salient limita-
tion to personalization may be not the ability to know subjects but
instead the normative appropriateness of gathering and using
vast sums of data.
When it is technically feasible and normatively acceptable to
gather and use granular data concerning individuals, personal-
ized law promises to better link directives with capacities and
needs. If lawmakers could assess drivers’ capabilities—under cer-
tain conditions and on certain stretches of road—they could craft
a personalized speed limit reflective of those capabilities. If law-
makers could figure out why a trader wants to place a large or-
der—to manipulate the market or to offset a major increase in
farming capacity—they could modify commodity futures position
limits accordingly. Conversely, if it is too costly to get and use
personal data, or if privacy concerns bar this strategy, then the
only alternative is impersonal law.
Many of the examples in this Essay ask about the trade-off
between ex ante impersonal rules and ex ante personalized rules:
whether the speed limit should tell everyone the same number or
whether the dashboards should dictate different speeds to differ-
ent drivers. But the rise of personalized ex ante law can also come
at the expense of ex post personalized law, and this transition is
also a function of knowledge.
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Ex ante personalized law gives specific, personalized man-
dates ahead of action, such as a dashboard speed limit. Ex post
personalized law takes account of personal characteristics but
only after an event has occurred or litigation has commenced.29
Legal standards such as the “reasonable person” standard, which
factfinders apply to specific circumstances, have always involved
a degree of personalization ex post.30 The new movement to per-
sonalization is largely about moving personalization forward in
time—giving more granular guidance on what legal directive
would have been implemented through open or vague standards
later.
Higher levels of ex ante knowledge allow higher levels of ex
ante personalization. We can create a personalized speed limit in
advance of driving only if we know important features about the
driver at that time. If lawmakers lack that knowledge, they may
acquire it through individualized factfinding in adjudication. As
generalized information acquisition and analysis become cheaper,
it becomes feasible to do more of our personalization on the front
end in ways that strike us as utterly new but are really extensions
of existing practices.
Framing personalization questions in the ex ante/ex post lit-
erature allows new perspectives on the knowledge question. If it
is costly to acquire information, it is generally better to pay for it
ex post, only when it is needed.31 However, the amortized cost of
the information falls if it can be used in many transactions, with
and without the same subjects. Pre-accident assessment of a
driver’s capacities allows the lawmaker to personalize mandates
29 See Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1408–09 (cited in note 5).
30 See id at 1407 (explaining that, with standards, “[t]he exact content of the law
comes after an individual acts, as judges and other adjudicators determine whether the
individual’s specific behavior in a particular context violates the standard”).
31 This point has been made with respect to contract drafting. See Richard A. Posner,
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex L Rev 1581, 1582, 1609–11
(2005) (explaining that parties may purposefully leave some contract terms ambiguous
due to high information costs); Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Anticipating Liti-
gation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L J 814, 835–39 (2006) (discussing the tradeoffs be-
tween front- and back-end costs when writing contracts); Steven Shavell, On the Writing
and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J L Econ & Org 289, 297–98 (2006) (“It is assumed
that parties write the contract with highest expected value, that is, the contract maximizes
the expected value of the interpreted contract minus the writing costs.”). See also Albert
Choi and George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37
J Legal Stud 503, 520–23 (2008) (discussing the trade-off between investment costs and
litigation costs). One cost of drafting contracts is learning enough to write more complete
terms.
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for every drive the driver takes—lowering the per-use cost to po-
tentially far lower than the cost of just acquiring this information
in connection with a tort suit.
Relatedly, we should not assume that all improvements in
information technology push in favor of ex ante personalization;
some such improvements will lead to greater personalization, but
predominantly of the ex post variety. Improved information sys-
tems may make it easier for courts to verify information that was
previously observable only by the parties. When information is
observable but not verifiable, it is difficult to personalize ex post.
If new information technology increases verifiability, it will in-
crease the viability of judicial personalization after the fact, caus-
ing much of the increase in personalization to express itself in the
low-tech, ex post variety familiar to lawyers.
For example, consider the canonical category of an observable
but not verifiable contract term: product quality.32 A buyer may
be able to observe the quality of the goods or services she buys—
the buyer has expert knowledge and taste, or perhaps the quality
becomes obvious to any repeat customer—but these subtle cues
may be challenging to communicate to a court. A driver observes
that her car is of low quality by feeling its sometimes slow accel-
eration and paying for its greater than average maintenance
costs, but it is hard for her to show that low quality to a court:
Perhaps the car works fine the one day it is judicially examined.
And the factfinder may be unsure whether the higher mainte-
nance costs are because the car is a lemon or because the driver
herself is a reckless operator. Car quality is easily observable but
not easily verifiable. Terms warranting car quality are less effec-
tive as a result.
Improved data-gathering technology may make warranty
terms more effective by improving verification. Suppose a car or
cell phone logs the driver’s use of the car—it may be easier for her
to show that she drives only at typical speeds or only on typically
smooth roads, making less debatable the cause of the car’s prob-
lems. If the car or user’s cell phone record noise levels, it will be
easier to demonstrate to the factfinder that a growling noise is
typical (even if the car isn’t so loud when examined by the court).
32 See Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 37–38 n 15 (Oxford
1995); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724, 1741 (2001). See also
Robert Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 279,
286–87 (2006).
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Passive data gathering makes it more feasible to adjudicate qual-
ity terms ex post, allowing parties to substitute away from the
alternative, inflexible, and impersonal ex ante contractual prox-
ies for quality (such as warranties that cover a precise list of re-
pairs for a precise period of time).
Let us take the warranty notion one step further. Some war-
ranties of quality are deeply personalized. Take the warranty of
fitness for purpose, whether express or implied.33 A warranty of
fitness for purpose is an assurance of quality that is personalized
to the user. A typical widget buyer may need one level of quality,
while this buyer may need an altogether different—and higher—
level given her intended purpose.
Personalized warranties face a double verification problem:
the court must detect both the quality level and the unique needs
of the buyer.34 When the buyer complains that the widget is not
fit for its purpose, how can the court confirm the buyer’s purpose?
How can the court reject claims by buyers who have fabricated a
special purpose after the fact? Technological innovations in
recordkeeping may help with this verification task. The buyer’s
factory (or even the widgets themselves) may keep records of the
buyer’s pattern of widget use—making clear whether this widget
was used as past widgets were and whether the buyer really did
have a different pattern of use from other customers. It will be
easier to spot buyers whose widgets failed as a result of postpur-
chase changes in the buyer’s business rather than as a result of
pre-existing purposes. The seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s pur-
pose may also be indirectly proven through ubiquitous data gath-
ering. If we can gather the use pattern of all the seller’s custom-
ers, we may discover that this seller’s clientele overwhelmingly
uses the widget in a particular way, supporting or undermining
the seller’s purported ignorance of the plaintiff’s purpose.
The warranty of fitness for purpose is a personalized ex post
contract term, and it is one that many parties have opted away
from using.35 Yet improvements in verification technology may
make it cheaper and more accurate to use, perhaps resuscitating
an entire domain of contract law focused on ex post personalization.
33 See UCC § 2-315.
34 Actually, the problem has a third aspect: the court must verify that the seller had
reason to know the buyer’s unique needs. The seller’s knowledge may have been observed
by the parties, but it is not easy to prove to a court what exactly was said in negotiations.
35 Indeed, it is customary practice for sellers to disclaim the implied warranty of fit-
ness for purpose to the maximum extent permitted.
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Outside of contract, information technology innovations will
lower ex post verification costs in tort, with resultant reductions
in ex ante regulation and bureaucracy: things that were previ-
ously seen by parties or known only in an intuitive way may now
be recorded in formats that are easy to share with the court. For
example, ubiquitous smart watches with health monitors will be
able to inform medical malpractice and toxic tort suits by serving
to substantiate the parties’ claim that the plaintiff was (or wasn’t)
in generally good health before the defendant’s action. Matching
a remedy to a tort victim’s preexisting health has always been a
form of ex post personalization in the law, but information tech-
nology will make this easier and more precise.
The fruit of this data is harvested only at the time of litiga-
tion, and it may reduce the pressure to craft front-end rules built
to give similar results. If we know that once-healthy plaintiffs will
be fully compensated ex post, we can work less hard to craft ex
ante prophylactic safety rules for doctors and polluting factories—
potential tortfeasors can be better trusted to manage their own
risks knowing they will generally internalize the costs. At pre-
sent, many rules and procedures, from workplace safety laws to
Food and Drug Administration approvals, may reflect a fear that
the legal system will undercompensate plaintiffs who cannot
prove their personalized injury; alternatively, rigid ex ante proce-
dures may serve to protect defendants from overly generous com-
pensation to plaintiffs who can fake greater than average desert.36
Either way, complex ex ante rules may prove less important, and
can be less detailed, if ex post legal personalization is improved
through better data gathering and processing.
Criminal law, too, may experience much of its personaliza-
tion ex post. Professor Deborah Denno describes in her essay how
improvements in neuroscience may allow courts to produce more
just results for particular criminal defendants. Customizing crim-
inal liability and punishment to particular brains is a clear case
of personalization, but no one will imagine that this can be done
in advance using the futuristic microdirectives that Professors
Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett predict.37 Instead, criminal
36 Insofar as potential tortfeasors adopt their own checklists, procedures, and record-
keeping in order to protect themselves against outsized, impersonal liability—and insofar
as ex post personalization of liability reduces the need for these procedures—greater
personalization of public law can reduce the need for private legalism.
37 Compare Denno, 86 U Chi L Rev at 370–80 (cited in note 1) (advocating for a more
personalized approach to criminal law that takes into account individual neuroscientific
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laws of general application will govern and direct everyone, but
some individuals will be subject to different consequences when
they transgress. These different consequences will emerge from
courts’ verification of brain states and probably also from superior
verification of lifestyle factors previously detected only impres-
sionistically. A defendant’s cell phone may keep good records of
her travels and social network—powerfully confirming or discon-
firming an incomplete psychological evaluation.
Conversely, it is possible that the new forms of information
available will be of little help to courts. Perhaps the kinds of sta-
tistical relationships latent in big data cannot be usefully evalu-
ated by judges or juries. Then the proportion of observable but not
verifiable information may rise as parties acquire data to which
courts are insensitive. That would lead to greater pressure for
precise ex ante personalization. Ironically, algorithmic law is
more likely to be prominent in our daily lives if it is baffling for
nonexperts. If the legally relevant insights of big data can be com-
municated to laypeople, it will be easier to harvest them through
traditional judicial processes rather than pervasive contractual
and administrative directives.
C. Knowledge of Law
There are usually good reasons to let legal subjects know the
content of the law. Legal knowledge is intrinsically valuable and
instrumentally a precondition to accountability. If laws are
illegible, subjects may find it difficult to object to them. In
contractual settings, individuals may assent to complex but
unfair or inefficient contracts. In public legal settings, voters may
tolerate lousy laws (and lousy lawmakers) if they cannot easily
understand the law.
Just as equality can be divided into formal equality and prac-
tical equality, knowledge of the law can be subdivided too, with
personalization arguably increasing one conception of legal
knowledge at the expense of the other.
The great advantage of personalized law is that it may be bet-
ter at guiding and informing individuals about their obligations.
When technology permits microdirectives, lawmakers can give
certainty directly to individuals, instructing them on the law’s
evidence), with Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1410–12 (cited in note 5) (describing how
technology might facilitate the emergence of microdirectives: highly personalized and
specific legal directives transmitted to individuals before they act).
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content given their exact circumstances. Casey and Niblett imag-
ine a world of specific and live guidance:
[A] specific microdirective is selected and communicated to a
particular driver (perhaps on a dashboard display) as a pre-
cise speed for the specific conditions she faces. For example,
a microdirective might provide a speed limit of 51.2 miles per
hour for a particular driver with twelve years of experience
on a rainy Tuesday at 3:27 p.m.38
With a dashboard speed limiter, drivers have complete certainty
about their obligations at a given time. Live, personalized direc-
tives inform subjects better than constant, free legal advice.
Even lower-tech personalization promises to guide subjects
before and during action. Ben-Shahar and Porat describe how
linking negligence law to characteristics of individuals may give
them a more accurate self-assessment of how the law will treat
them than would a vague legal standard.39 Individuals may have
greater certainty under a personalized tort law keyed to what is
reasonable for them because they know whether they are unusu-
ally capable or incapable of safely performing certain tasks. Con-
struction contractors and parties to financial derivatives already
use ongoing quasi adjudicators to specify vague contractual terms
on an ongoing basis.40 Personalization allows subjects to act law-
fully without as much guesswork.
Yet there are also knowledge costs to personalization. Imper-
sonal laws are better for subject-to-subject legal education. If laws
are impersonal, then individuals can learn from one another
about the law. If Mary complains about getting a ticket for speed-
ing at 66 miles per hour, Todd learns something about the law in
action because that same speed limit applies to him. Not only can
Todd learn from the anecdotes directly related to him, he can also
learn from norms and culture that develop in light of myriad en-
counters with the law. If no one in Todd’s neighborhood parks
their cars on the sidewalk or if passengers in the car express con-
cern when Todd edges his car up over the curb, Todd may infer
that the law in his community disallows sidewalk parking.
38 Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1404 (cited in note 5).
39 Ben-Shahar and Porat, 91 NYU L Rev at 677 (cited in note 5) (“Personalized stand-
ards . . . require no learning, as much as they harness information injurers already have
about themselves.”).
40 See Verstein, 55 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1912–14 (cited in note 6) (describing the
quasi-adjudicative role that the International Swaps and Derivatives Association plays).
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This learning does not work as well if law is personalized. If
cars whiz by Todd on the highway, he cannot infer that the speed
limit is higher than he thought because the other drivers may be
authorized to drive at a faster speed. If Todd’s friends are light-
hearted about even large online purchases, remarking how easy
it is to return items, Todd should still be cautious before trading.
Their history of easy returns may be because of different contract
terms than those he will get. Their past performance is no predic-
tor of his future results.
Subject-to-subject learning also goes the other direction.
Todd’s experiences with the law allow him to predict Mary’s legal
rights and constraints. This knowledge allows Todd to give Mary
amateur legal advice, but it also allows him to coordinate his in-
teractions with her. If he hires her to deliver a package, he has
some sense of her legal constraints—he need not wonder if she
will be waylaid by police for driving at the speed necessary to
make the delivery.41 If Todd competes with Mary for business op-
portunities, he need not wonder whether Mary can lawfully drive
much faster than him to meet the prospective client or chase the
proverbial ambulance.
These interpersonal considerations are important even in im-
personal settings. For example, commodities traders care deeply
about whether other traders are subject to the same rules. They
take positions and implement trading strategies with some sense
of how other traders might behave. They must tread lightly if the
position limits of other traders are variable and, thus, unknown.
For example, in 1989, soy bean traders were caught unaware
when a major trader secured an exemption from normal trading
limits and promptly cornered the markets.42 Personalized law
leads to potentially higher risk and learning costs in interper-
sonal interactions, even in settings in which standardization and
predictable rules are prized.
Impersonal law allows knowledge through orthodox learning
efforts, such as looking up cases and statutes. It is easier to look
41 These differences also go to equality, as discussed earlier. Does it stigmatize Mary,
or harm her employment prospects, if she has lessened driving rights relative to Todd?
Does it stigmatize her if she has superior return rights for online purchases, reflecting the
state’s determination that she is more likely to make purchasing and contracting errors?
Does it undermine the legitimacy of market outcomes if competitors play by different
rules?
42 See Robert A. Rosenblatt, U.S. Agency Forced Ferruzzi to Trim Soybean Holdings
(LA Times, July 21, 1989), archived at http://perma.cc/9DEU-TFB9 (noting that new rules
applied only to Ferruzzi, which had a special exemption).
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at case law if the myriad disputes all contribute to precedent on
the same law. If different mandates apply to different people, it
becomes easier to distinguish cases and harder to build a common
body of law on a subject.
By disregarding numerous contextual factors, impersonal
law is also somewhat easier to record as a public text. At least in
theory, an attentive person can learn the law by looking it up.
Although statutes and administrative rules are not easy to read,
they are natural language, follow conventional rules of English
grammar, and are of a finite length. An intelligent person can
learn a lot about a law’s operation by looking at its official text.
By contrast, personalized law may be recordable only as an
algorithm or a set of interrelated rules, perhaps cross-referencing
a data set. It may require new skills to understand, such as data
science or computer programming.43 Even legislators may be un-
able to understand what they have voted on. The complexity of
these rules may make them incomprehensible to subjects and
raise the cost of legal certainty. In other cases, the law itself may
be fashioned only in broad terms, with the personalization opera-
tionalized outside the contract, statute, or rule.44
It is true that microdirectives would obviate the need to look
up the law to resolve any particular case, but one might want to
look up the law for a reason other than a particular dispute. One
might want to understand how broad classes of cases work or to
see the law’s entire sweep so as to know whether it is a good law.
To change directions somewhat, let us note that legal
knowledge (in any conception) is not an unalloyed good. When law
is public, subjects can behave strategically to exploit it. Personal-
ized law may be more desirable when the risk of strategic behav-
ior is high, so long as the personalized law is sufficiently granular
and robust to avoid new forms of strategic behavior. Microdirec-
tives can give specific mandates without empowering the subject
to seek out loopholes or vulnerabilities.
43 My claim is not that these skills are harder to learn than the legal skills needed
to properly learn impersonal law. I simply mean that these skills are not currently deemed
part of the ordinary process of learning the law. We have an inchoate sense of what counts
as legal knowledge, and that body of knowledge does not currently include these skills. It
may be desirable to abandon the old conception of legal knowledge, or to modify it, but it
remains true that a step toward personalized law is at odds with an orthodox conception
of legal knowledge.
44 See Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J at 1410 (cited in note 5) (“The lawmaker can set
a broad objective, which might look like a standard. But the predictive technology will
take the standard and engineer a vast catalog of context-specific rules for every scenario.”).
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As for accountability, the complexity of personalized law is
also a form of ultimate transparency. If law takes account of
twenty factors and assigns each certain coefficients, subjects can
more precisely determine whether the lawmaker is giving appro-
priate weight to the relevant considerations. If lawmakers in-
clude, say, race as one factor in the law’s contours, subjects can
immediately object if they think this should not be part of the law.
Such objections are harder if an impersonal law weighs but does
not cite the suspect factor. Yet it can be hard to eliminate bias
from such systems, and superficial efforts to do so may actually
exacerbate the problem.45
II. WHEN SHOULD LAW PRIVATIZE?
Regardless of whether speed limits should be personal or
impersonal, should they be created by the Department of
Transportation or by Google? Regardless of whether position
limits should be personal or impersonal, should they be created
by the CFTC or by the commodities exchanges? A substantial
literature discusses the comparative merits of government
regulation, private regulation, and private ordering.
This Part presents a quick summary of the literature on pri-
vatized law. As with personalization, we can view the choice as a
function of several considerations. Here, the three considerations
are: scope of legitimate power, incentives, and knowledge.
A. Scope of Legitimate Power
Private regulation ultimately derives its authority from con-
sent. If individuals meaningfully agree to a system of regulation,
we are often content to pronounce that system legitimate as to
them. Consent faces limitations, of course. For one thing, the con-
sent must be meaningful rather than the result of error or duress.
Moreover, some rights cannot be surrendered by contract and so
cannot be surrendered through regulations secured by mere
agreement. Overall, voluntary systems secure a presumptive
legitimacy, which may be bounded by concern for substantive or
procedural unconscionability.
An assent-based system of regulation faces strong practical
limits. If assent must be secured, then the fixed cost of securing
assent must be paid many times over. It is therefore suitable only
45 See Talia B. Gillis and Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U Chi L
Rev 459, 467–73 (2019) (discussing how input restrictions may worsen discrimination).
568 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:551
when the costs of contracting are low or the benefits from the deal
are particularly high.46
More importantly, it may sometimes prove difficult to secure
assent. Some potential subjects of regulation may resist partici-
pation unless the rules can be made favorable to their preferred
conduct. But what is incentive-compatible for a given agent may
not be the best rule for the group.
Public law secures its legitimacy not through actual consent
but through some foundation explicable in political philosophy.47
While the details of this foundation may be contested, we usually
hold state action to political, procedural, and substantive stand-
ards. Politically, the current practices of the state must be trace-
able to current politics in a way that grounds law in the will of its
subjects. Procedurally, states must regularize their use of power.
For example, certain rights may be compromised but only by law
enforcement officials after a suitable trial. Substantively, states
are constrained by their constitutions and perhaps other features
of justice to protect certain rights and interests.
These two different legitimacy structures may bear on the ap-
propriateness of privatizing law. Consent-based legitimacy is on
stronger ground in regulating optional behavior by sophisticated
individuals engaged in actual contracting. For example, commod-
ity futures traders are sophisticated actors who meet to exchange
contracts for future delivery. To some degree, if they disagree
with any given trading rule, they can trade at another venue. The
case for private regulation by commodities exchanges is therefore
strong.
In some ways, the assent-based case is even stronger than
the public law case for stock and commodities regulation. Many
traders are not located in the United States. When such traders
trade on a purely electronic exchange, the jurisdictional case for
American law is debatable.48 Is federal law responsive enough to
make its force legitimate to overseas traders? No such debate is
46 See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 Emory L J 1401, 1411 (2009) (noting that, if consent is inexpensive, parties
will achieve an efficient outcome, but if consent is expensive, parties will achieve ineffi-
cient outcomes).
47 For a discussion of consent-based and other theories of legitimacy, see Fabienne
Peter, Political Legitimacy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Apr 24, 2017), archived
at http://perma.cc/R48M-EYD7.
48 To be clear, it is not debatable as a matter of actual law. The link to a US exchange
would clearly suffice to establish jurisdiction.
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necessary if the traders have actually consented in contract to the
rules of the exchange.
Automotive speed limits are less readily amenable to
consent-based legitimacy. If there is only one road to one’s house,
one cannot realistically decline the terms of the relevant law-
maker. Conversely, the transaction cost of securing assent on
every distant road, traveled just one time in an individual’s life,
could prove too high. Nor do we imagine it would be legitimate for
private actors to coercively secure compliance. If the only way to
stop excessive speeding on a private road is to imprison a person,
we are unlikely to think that contractual assent will suffice to jus-
tify private imprisonment. By contrast, the state’s distinctive role
in regulating safe use of public thoroughfares makes its coercive
enforcement quite plausible.
The scope of assent-based regulation can be expanded or
reduced through government action. Private regulators are better
able to impose their rules if they have market power. Otherwise,
their subjects can substitute away rather than assent. With
market power, their subjects may be forced to accept the private
regulations. The scope of assent-based regulation can thereby
expand as market power does. And market power can expand or
contract depending on the state’s stance toward the private
regulator.
For example, stock exchanges have sometimes sought to ban
their members from trading on other exchanges or to ban listed
companies from being traded in other venues.49 These rules un-
dermine the ability of other venues to compete for trading volume,
and so they make it easier for the rulemaking exchange to condi-
tion its services on the acceptance of its directives.50 The state de-
cision of whether to enforce or invalidate such exclusivity clauses
can prove decisive for the power of private regulators.
Aside from merely tolerating these clauses, the government
can do even more to protect the competitive position of private
lawmakers. For example, the trading and price data generated by
exchanges is valuable and allows off-exchange traders to free ride.
If exchanges have intellectual property rights in this information,
49 For a description of one such attempt, see J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry M. Netter,
and James A. Overdahl, Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges
from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J L & Econ 591, 608–09 (1991).
50 See id at 604 (explaining that courts recognize exchanges’ rules as voluntarily ac-
cepted and do not consider rules prohibiting trading with nonmembers to unlawfully re-
strict trade).
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or if they can keep the prices secret as a matter of practice, then
the trading venue is in a strong position to condition access upon
rule adherence.51
Yet market power can be used for reasons other than optimal
rulemaking. Indeed, market power can permit private actors the
freedom to neglect the quality of the rules they produce if they are
insulated from competition from other lawmakers.52 For these
reasons, courts and legislatures have sometimes taken a skeptical
view of each of the market-power–increasing practices described
in the previous two paragraphs.53
Getting a sense of the wisdom of market power in a given case
requires a look at incentives, to which I now turn.
B. Incentives
Ideally, public actors are motivated by public interest con-
cerns and are constrained by democratic forces when they diverge
from the public interest. By contrast, the public choice literature
examines the private incentives of public actors.54 Laws that im-
pose concentrated costs or benefits may spur interest groups to
organize and demand regulation suitable to their needs rather
51 See id at 625–26 (“By allowing the exchanges to establish rights to such property,
[courts] enabled the exchanges to reap the gains from technological innovation and
thereby promoted the growth of exchanges.”). See also Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago v Christie Grain & Stock Co, 198 US 236, 250–51 (1905) (recognizing an ex-
change’s property right in price information and right to block transfer to other trading
venues).
52 See Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The
Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J L & Econ 141, 149–57 (1995) (criticizing optimistic
views of market self-regulation).
53 See, for example, Silver v New York Stock Exchange, 373 US 341, 364 (1963)
(“Congress in effecting a scheme of self-regulation designed to insure fair dealing cannot
be thought to have sanctioned and protected self-regulative activity when carried out in a
fundamentally unfair manner.”); Thill Securities Corp v New York Stock Exchange, 433
F2d 264, 272 (7th Cir 1970) (noting that private exchange commissions’ principal respon-
sibility for regulation comes from Congress’s antitrust laws, not its own self-regulation
doctrine); 17 CFR §§ 242.610, 242.611(c) (guaranteeing reasonable access to trading price
data and requiring brokers to route intermarket sweep orders wherever the price is best).
54 See, for example, Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rap-
prochement, in Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell, eds, Research Handbook on
Public Choice and Public Law 19, 20–25 (Edward Elgar 2010) (noting that public choice
theory stands in stark contrast to “an idealized version of the democratic-bureaucratic
process”).
2019] Privatizing Personalized Law 571
than the public’s needs.55 Another perspective on government be-
havior emphasizes the personal incentives of individual officials.
In a system like ours that emphasizes job security rather than
career advancement, the incentives for any action, good or bad,
may be muted.
Private actors operate with different incentives. When pri-
vate actors internalize the benefits they create, we can expect vig-
orous action. Even large and complicated projects can be under-
taken by raising funds in capital markets. If private actors can
charge for high quality regulation and enforcement, we can expect
high quality regulation and enforcement. This is the central claim
of those who would emphasize the stock or commodities exchange
as the optimal regulator.56
However, when private actors do not internalize the benefits
they create, they may regulate suboptimally.57 For example, when
regulations impose costs on third parties who are not in privity
with the regulator, the regulator has little reason to take their
well-being into account.58
Moreover, even when all the relevant parties are privy to
contracts with the regulator, the regulator may still take
inefficient steps to extract surplus. For example, a monopolist
may undersupply its product in order to charge more. In the
regulatory context, the regulator may deprive certain parties of
access to the regulated venue, or it may customize the rules to
advantage favored clients.59
C. Knowledge
One common argument in favor of private regulation is that
the private actors may have greater knowledge and expertise
55 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 9–11 (1965) (discussing how private companies employ effective lobbying to
advance regulation and policy to benefit their respective products).
56 See, for example, Mahoney, 83 Va L Rev at 1477 (cited in note 4) (“If stock markets
face sufficient competition, then, restrictive rules will survive only to the extent they are
efficient.”).
57 See id at 1463. See also Pirrong, 38 J L & Econ at 150–57 (cited in note 52) (arguing
that exchanges lack incentives to prevent manipulation).
58 Relatedly, when the regulator imposes a benefit on third parties but is unable to
charge effectively for it, the regulator may gain incentives to discontinue or malproduce
the public good. See Gabriel Rauterberg and Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law,
Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 Yale J Reg 1, 37 (2013).
59 See Mahoney, 83 Va L Rev at 1463 (cited in note 4).
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than administrative agencies or Congress.60 This is often local
knowledge, learned on the ground by practicing the regulated
subject as a career. Governmental actors can acquire this infor-
mation only dimly, by drawing it out of the regulated subjects.
Yet even if government knowledge of an industry may be in-
ferior to the participants in that industry, the government has
access to many industries. Secondhand knowledge of many do-
mains may sometimes matter more than firsthand knowledge of
any one domain. Still, the relative importance of global knowledge
is not itself a justification for government regulation rather than
private regulation because the government can of course share its
findings with the world. For example, the government researches
numerous factors relevant to commodity production, but it then
releases that information to the public—for private individuals to
use however they like.
The case for government regulation is therefore stronger
when global knowledge is required and when the government
faces limitations on its ability to share the knowledge. The gov-
ernment may acquire proprietary information about given firms,
which would not be available to any private actor but would be
inappropriate to share with competitors and customers. For ex-
ample, the government demands extensive information about
banks, but disclosing that information could lead to bank runs.
As another example, the government solicits information about
industrial companies, but disclosing that information could facil-
itate collusion by erstwhile competitors. It is sometimes better for
the government to retain the global informational advantage and
regulate in light of that information.
III. HOW DOES PRIVATIZATION BEAR ON PERSONALIZATION?
Should directives be personal or impersonal? Should they be
governmental or private? I have explored these questions in iso-
lation, but I now consider one in light of the other. In this Part, I
take for granted that the facts or concerns implicated would nat-
urally call for personalized law. Can we conclude anything about
the appropriate author of the private law from the utility of per-
sonalized law alone? In this Part, I explore a number of possible
60 See, for example, Gadinis and Jackson, 80 S Cal L Rev at 1253, 1298 (cited in
note 4) (“There are strong arguments in favor of permitting exchanges to set their own
trading rules, as they possess higher expertise and are better placed to understand the
demands of the market.”).
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implications. While there are many threads in the discussion be-
low, one theme emerges: the move to personalized law is often
best taken by private lawmakers. Thus, as both a descriptive and
normative matter, a future that makes the best use of personal-
ized law should involve a diminished role for state directives.
A. Kaldor-Hicks Personalization
Personalized law may involve giving some individuals
tougher treatment than they would get under an impersonal law.
These individuals are likely to resist the imposition of the di-
rective. Sometimes this will suggest the importance of state reg-
ulation, which can be imposed without assent. Yet the victims of
legal change often form effective lobbying groups. Moreover, the
sort of government able to resist NIMBY interests may also be
the sort of government that generally undercounts the cost of le-
gal change to those subject to the new law.61 The sort of govern-
ment with the grit to impose Kaldor-Hicks efficient62 personaliza-
tion may also be the sort that settles for inefficient
personalization.
Private regulation will often provide a better framework for
securing compliance and evaluating the appropriateness of the
personalization. Consider a modification to the commodities posi-
tion limits rules that would grant Alpha greater freedom to buy
futures than anyone else, in recognition of the fact that Alpha is
clearly a farmer with a legitimate need to hedge. Conversely, the
exchange also considers a rule that would impose a more strin-
gent position limit on Beta, surmising that Beta owns no physical
commodities and is therefore more likely (at the margin) to de-
fault on any futures she buys.
If these are wise changes that actually create value, then
Alpha should be willing to pay more for her privilege—enough to
compensate any objectors to the change. Beta may not like having
more limits, but the exchange can offer Beta a discount owing to
her different status. The discount can reflect the reduced risk
(paid for by Delta and other traders who are happy about the re-
duced risk). The only trader who would be displeased by such a
61 Consider James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed (Yale 1998).
62 See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L
Rev 509, 513 (1980) (“One state of affairs (E’) is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another (E) if
and only if those whose welfare increases in the move from E to E’ could fully compensate
those whose welfare diminishes with a net gain in welfare.”).
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discount is one who really planned to impose risks on the ex-
change through her large positions—and the exchange can take
comfort that the failure to strike a deal with such a trader is a
good sign.
The gains from personalization rely not just on the regula-
tor’s knowledge of the subject but also on the subjects’ knowledge
of the regulator. If information about the private regulator is lim-
ited, it might grant Beta an inefficient privilege in exchange for a
side payment. Such a risk is present for impersonal law but is
perhaps smaller because Beta’s privilege would have to take the
form of an exemption from a general law, rather than just another
twist in the road for a complex personalized law. The same is true
for personalized laws that impose costs on third parties.
When these risks are high, private lawmaking may be
comparatively less appropriate for personalization. Still, we
should not overstate our ability to locate cases in which private
lawmakers are exploiting their position such that the state would
do better.63
B. Secret Law
Professors Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi have evalu-
ated the incentives of private actors to produce excellent laws.64
They juxtapose two means of monetizing the lawmaking. If intel-
lectual property rights are available, then private actors can in-
ternalize many of the benefits of their creation by charging users
for a license to use the laws.65 If such protection is unavailable,
they can monetize the laws only indirectly.66 For example, mem-
bers of a bar association can monetize laws by including subopti-
mal terms that drive demand for legal services.67 For Ribstein and
63 See Mahoney 83 Va L Rev at 1476 (cited in note 4) (“There is no sharp contrast
between exchanges and governmental regulators where restrictive rules are concerned;
each has vacillated from time to time between support for and opposition to restrictive
rules.”).
64 Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Law as Product and Byproduct, 9 J L
Econ & Pol 521, 523–26 (2013) (“Private lawmakers could have stronger and better-
aligned incentives to produce efficient laws than do public legislators.”).
65 See id at 534–36.
66 See id at 537 (noting that, without effective intellectual property rights, not all
jurisdictions will pay the private law producer a licensing fee when it adopts the producer’s
set of provisions).
67 Id at 539–40.
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Kobayashi, this result is a defect that proves we ought to grant IP
rights in laws.68
Their analysis depends on the plausible assumption that law
must be public and, therefore, feasibly copied. Yet personalized
law may involve complex algorithms that may be hard to compre-
hend and reproduce without access to data.
We use personalized law when its benefits are sufficient to
offset our concerns about simplistically legible public laws. In
these cases, we could take the first step toward protecting legal
innovations without IP law. If lawmakers construct an excellent
legal rule and supplement it with excellent data, it may be diffi-
cult for competitors to recreate it based upon what is available in
the public domain. We could then count on better private lawmak-
ing without having to construct an IP regime for laws.
Consider a few examples. Professors Lior Strahilevitz and
Porat suggest that contract default rules be derived from the pref-
erences of one million “guinea pig” subjects, intended to represent
the population as a whole.69 The proposal imagines that the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or an industry consor-
tium might finance and conduct the surveys,70 but coordinated ef-
forts may lead to disagreement about what sorts of questions are
of interest. Companies wishing to clarify terms idiosyncratic to
their industry will find little support from the broader coalition.
They may finance their own supplemental surveys,71 but they
may be reluctant if other firms can free ride on the information
generated. This problem can be avoided if the survey results can
be kept for use only by the surveying firm or consortium72 (subject
to appropriate transparency for consumers who wish to under-
stand the contractual obligations they are assuming).
Consider also the speed limit example. If Google designed an
optimal system for speed limits that minimized accidents while
reducing commutes, it would have a valuable service. However,
its ability to sell the service to consumers, insurance companies,
68 See Kobayashi and Ribstein, 9 J L Econ & Pol at 539 (cited in note 64) (“[L]aws
drafted by private parties incentivized by property rights would be more likely to reflect
firms’ actual needs than byproduct laws, which are aimed at redistributing social wealth
to the interest groups who drafted the laws.”).
69 Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 5).
70 Id.
71 See Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract
Law, 66 Stan L Rev 545, 579–87 (2014) (proposing that individual firms survey their
customers regarding contract term meanings).
72 See Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1454–56 (cited in note 5).
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or states would be limited by the threat of free riding. If laws are
public and can be copied as a matter of principle, then competitors
could largely extract the fruit of Google’s labor. However, if we
are tolerant of opaque speed limits (so long as we receive micro-
directives and can audit the software if needed), then it will not
be feasible for competitors to steal Google’s secret sauce. Indeed,
if the microdirective were delivered directly to a self-driving car
rather than made legible to users, it would be difficult to even
reverse engineer the law as code.
In principle, government actors could also take advantage of
relative opacity of personalized laws as a substitute for intellec-
tual property rights in laws.73 If one state invents a better person-
alized corporate law, it may be able to slow adoption by other
states, and thus internalize the benefits of the innovation, if as-
pects of the law are not easily inferred from a public text. Any
time the quality of law is at all dependent upon lawmakers’ abil-
ity to internalize its benefits, the partial obscurity of personalized
law may be a useful feature in improving the quality of law.
Nevertheless, the accountability norms for public actors
make it less likely that personalized law algorithms will remain
private for long. Altogether, personalized law is likely to arise in
contexts in which private actors will be at a comparative ad-
vantage in pursuing the gains from legal innovation.
73 Personalization has other potential benefits in terms of secret public law.
Professor Saul Levmore has described how retroactive law can reduce gamesmanship and
strategic behavior. See Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 273–74 (cited in note 23). Professor
Casey has described the comparable benefit of microdirectives in reducing gamesmanship
while still allowing predictability and a measure of accountability. See Anthony J. Casey,
The Short Happy Life of Rules and Standards, at 39:03–41:00 (Feb 21, 2017), online at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TnbRApMEumU (visited Aug 27, 2018) (Perma archive
unavailable). Laws can be public at the level of their general mandate (“don’t drive
recklessly”), while the details of the algorithm remain out of sight.
Such a view breathes new life into an old debate in political theory: whether repre-
sentatives should be trustees, who use their own judgment on behalf of constituents, or
delegates, who just vote as their constituents would want them to. See Andrew Verstein,
Trustee or Delegate? Understanding Representation to Illuminate Shareholder Governance
and Regulatory Change, 9 Eur Co & Financial L Rev 74, 76 (2012). In recent years, the
delegate position has lost its luster. Sure, it made sense to send delegates at a time when
telecommunications were rare and travel was long. But it is now possible to conduct elec-
tronic referenda on issues. If there is an appeal to the delegate, it seems like it is at risk
of being replaced by an online plebiscite. To have representatives at all is to embrace the
trustee model. Or so one might have thought apart from secret, personalized public law.
However, with secret, personalized public law, general laws might be promulgated but the
specific code retained by the government. A district’s delegate would have access to the
code and could engage in legal reform if the code does not represent the district’s values,
but the code itself would remain out of the hands of those who could use it strategically.
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C. Knowledge of Local Subjects
Granular information about subjects is essential to worth-
while personalized law. Endorsing personalized law means over-
coming technical and normative obstacles to big-data personali-
zation. Private law actors are better positioned to respond to both
obstacles.
As we now know well, private actors have become leaders in
mining their customers for data. By providing location-sensitive
services, Google learns about its users’ daily movements, prefer-
ences, and capacities. The same is true of stock exchanges, which
observe individuals’ trades simply in order to effectuate them.
This local knowledge advantage is of highest value for personal-
ized laws because of the economies of scope among service provi-
sion, monitoring, and directive-giving.
Consider a personalized speed limit, and imagine that it has
been privately produced by Google. How will Google generate di-
rectives for individuals? It would have to monitor an individual’s
location through GPS, keep track of an individual’s driving his-
tory, and combine these and other data based on some kind of risk
prediction system. Yet these same links—such as live contact
with the car’s location—are also likely the means of delivering the
mandate. Google will have to communicate the directive, either to
the driver or the car (if it is self-driving). The same bilateral link
is likely to serve both purposes. Google could introduce the gov-
ernment into the chain, with Google sharing the car’s location
with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and then com-
municating the DOT’s mandate back to the driver, but these steps
are redundant if Google is already dealing with the customer.
Consider next the normative case, in which private actors are
better positioned to use the data available. The state’s legitimate
scope is ultimately tethered to its citizens’ expectations, whether
by electoral forces or its constitution. Americans are apprehensive
about government acquisition and use of data but appear far more
accepting of private gathering and use of information.74 Moreover,
private lawmakers’ scope of legitimate power is initially bounded
only by consent, meaning that firms can use information even
74 See Kenneth Olmsted and Aaron Smith, Americans’ Experiences with Data
Security (Pew Research Center, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4JGN-ET4C
(finding that Americans often trust private entities more than the federal government to
protect their private information).
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when people are squeamish so long as they remain blithe in waiv-
ing privacy rights.
Keeping privately generated information in the hands of pri-
vate lawmakers may reduce the chilling effect of using the infor-
mation. When subjects’ information is used to generate adverse
legal consequences, subjects may be reluctant to share their in-
formation. Right now, most people blithely share their infor-
mation with companies in connection with goods and services, but
they might not do so if the government used that information ag-
gressively to penalize or constrain them.75 If information remains
just with private actors, to use in making law related to their own
products and services, the private costs of personalized law could
be lower, and so voluntary participation may be greater.
The advantage of private actors is not unequivocal. When op-
timal personalization turns on global knowledge and this infor-
mation cannot be shared with private actors, the government may
be the appropriate personalizing body.
Still, when unshareable global knowledge is crucial, person-
alization is rarely the right policy anyway. When the government
surveys hidden information about banks and deems it appropri-
ate to act, the policy intervention is likely to be general. Recall
that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding used to
prop up the financial sector was distributed to many more banks
than actually required the money.76 This was in order to prevent
the TARP funding from creating a negative stigma for its users.
In the cases in which the government cannot share the infor-
mation, it will be because of the same problems that prevent the
government from personalizing law in light of that information.
Moreover, “global” is a relative term. Market stability may
require legal interventions (personal or otherwise) that take ac-
count of the actions of myriad traders. Yet much of this infor-
mation is available to the stock exchange, and even more could be
75 See Niva Elkin-Koren and Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-by-
Data on Data Markets, 86 U Chi L Rev 403, 416–17 (2019) (presenting evidence suggesting
that increased awareness of government surveillance prompts Americans to curb sensitive
data usage). On the other hand, individuals might not discontinue data sharing. They
might find the benefits of the services to still exceed the costs. Or a separating equilibrium
might occur in which those who avoid information sharing are, by default, given the tough-
est treatment so that nearly everyone opts back into information sharing.
76 Goldman Sachs wanted to decline the TARP funding, in part because it contained
limitations on bonus payments, but was cajoled into accepting. See Matt Taibbi, Secrets and
Lies of the Bailout (Rolling Stone, Jan 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/33ZV-X2UP.
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acquired. Personalization requires more than knowledge of a sin-
gle investor, but it does not require anything more “global” than
the exchange could learn from its own traders.
While the legitimate scope of action is often wider for the
assent-based regime of private regulation than for government
regulation, personalizing private regulation can still raise legiti-
macy objections. Even when consented to, personalized rules can
feel, well, personal. Traders may feel that updated requirements
reflect power dynamics within the exchange, with powerful trad-
ers able to force the exchange to change the rules to disadvantage
less powerful traders.77 Consider one trader’s statement about
why he was willing to brazenly ignore a reduced position limit:
Yes. [The exchange official] called me. He said I have to get
out some of my stuff[.] I ask him why? I mean. I don’t under-
stand. Why should I do that? I mean, when I’m losing half a
million dollars nobody told me to get out, and now I’m trying
to make a couple of bucks and they tell me to get out.78
The trader felt that the updated rules involved an unfair exercise
of human discretion, a sentiment expressed by other small
traders who have broken rules. Responsive position levels and
accountability levels are a good thing, but the human element of
the updating irks traders and makes the system seem less
credible. Perhaps limits driven by big data and delivered in an
impersonal fashion would allow greater personalization with
greater legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has examined the choice of optimal maker of per-
sonalized law. It teased out many of the considerations that bear
on the choice, and it identified the many factors that favor private
law in the context of personalized directives. Having made sub-
stantial progress on the question of what to personalize, we now
have some purchase on who should personalize.
77 See, for example, Zimmerman v Chicago Board of Trade, 360 F3d 612, 614 (7th
Cir 2004) (“The plaintiffs argue that the CBOT violated antitrust laws by adopting the
[adjusted position limits], not for proper regulatory purposes but instead out of self-
interest and to protect a politically powerful member of the CBOT.”); George Gunset,
CBOT Chief Answers to Iowa Soybean Farmers (Chicago Tribune, July 22, 1989), archived
at http://perma.cc/93L3-Q6Z8 (“‘It looks to me like that you took sides on this,’ said Ray
Heck, a soybean farmer from Perry, Ia. ‘It’s highly unfair . . . to us. You say the major
market participant was stubborn. It looks to me like you people were stubborn.’”).
78 Saberi, 488 F3d at 1211.
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Many questions remain, including how. Stating that the op-
timal regulator is a private regulator does not tell us the mecha-
nism by which private regulation is realized. In fact, there are
numerous options: the state can tolerate private regulation as it
arises, so long as it does not conflict with public law, or it can go
further and honor private law even when inconsistent with public
law; the state can let its subjects opt in or out of private regula-
tion, or it can compel their accepting private lawmakers in the
same way as it mandates insurance for drivers or registration
with a self-regulatory organization for stock brokers. The right
answer may depend on the domain.
